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MEMORANDUM FOR THE
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ISSUES:
WHAT PRECAUTIONS AND REMEDIES MAY A TRIAL CHAMBER EXERCISE
WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILS TO APPEAR? IF THE PURPOSE OF A
DEFENDANT IS TO DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS, IS REPLACING COUNSEL
TANTAMOUNT TO ACCEDING TO SUCH DELAY?
WHY ARE TRIBUNALS RELUCTANT TO RELY ON CO-COUNSEL SERVING AS
LEAD COUNSEL? SHOULD DUTY COUNSEL BE APPOINTED? SHOULD THE
INTERNATIONAL COURTS USE A PUBLIC-DEFENDER SYSTEM TO AVOID SUCH
PROBLEMS?
DO NATIONAL BARS HAVE A DUTY TO HONOR PUNISHMENTS DOLED OUT BY
THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS? IS THERE ANY PRACTICAL EFFECT?
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I. ISSUES AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues*
Defense counsel before the various international criminal tribunals will sometimes
boycott proceedings in an effort to damage the credibility of the tribunal and cause delay.1 Such
tactics raise a myriad of issues, foremost among them is the scope of the tribunal’s authority to
sanction counsel while at the same time safeguarding the rights of the defendant.2 This
memorandum discusses the punitive measures available to the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (“ICTR”) when dealing with defense counsel who refuses to appear in order to delay
proceedings. The fairness of using standard counsel, co-counsel, stand-by counsel, duty counsel,
or a public-defender system to combat such delay tactics is also addressed.3 Finally, the question

*

What precautions/remedies does a Trial Chamber have when defense counsel fails to appear? And if a defendant’s
purpose is to delay the proceedings, isn’t replacing a counsel tantamount to acceding to such delay? Why are
Tribunals apparently reluctant to rely on co-counsel to serve as lead counsel? Should a duty counsel be appointed?
Should the ICC use a public-defender system to avoid such problems? Do national bars have a duty to honor
punishments delved out by the International Tribunals? Is there any practical effect?
1

Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67, at para. 22, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing
Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defence (ICTY Trial Chamber II, May 9, 2003) [hereinafter Seselj]
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].

2

The delays caused when counselors fail to appear cost international tribunals two of their most precious resources
– namely, time and money. It is important to compare standard counsel with co-counsel, stand-by counsel, duty
counsel and public defenders. Standard counsel is counsel hired by and paid for by a detainee. Co-counsel is
secondary counsel hired by and paid for by the detainee. Stand-by counsel is a court appointed attorney who is to be
involved in the preparation of the case, who is to assist the accused when necessary, and who is to be ready to take
the place of standard counsel should the need arise. Duty counsel is used in situations where a detainee has not yet
retained counsel nor has had counsel appointed. Duty counsel fills a temporary role and generally is involved in
introductory stages such as explaining charges to a detainee and explaining pleas to a detainee. Public defenders
would fill all of these roles. Public defenders function primarily as standard and co-counsel. In addition, public
defenders render stand-by counsel unnecessary by preventing belligerent counsel from representing detainees.
Finally, with a public defender system in place, duty counsel will also be unnecessary because the public defenders
will be ready to represent defendants from the earliest possible moment.

3

See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, at Rule 44 bis, available
at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/rules/070605/070605.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2006) [hereinafter ICTR Rules]
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

7

of whether national bars have a duty to honor punishments delved out by International Tribunals
is discussed.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Under The Rule Of Procedure And Evidence Of The ICTR, Counsel Failing
To Appear May Be Withdrawn, Refused An Audience Before The Tribunal,
Or Suffer “Any Other Sanctions” That The Tribunal Deems Appropriate.
Under Rule 44 (B), as a condition precedent to appear before a Trial Chamber, counsel is
subject to, among other regulations, any rules adopted by the Tribunal, the Code of Conduct and
the code of ethics governing their profession.4
Under Rule 45 quarter, as insurance against counsel failing to appear, a Trial Chamber
may assign one or more co-counsel to represent the detainee.5 The initial counsel retains primary
responsibility for the conduct of the defense; but should the initial counsel be unavailable or be
replaced, the appointed co-counsel automatically assumes responsibility for the case.6
Under Rule 45 ter (B), when counsel fails to appear, a Trial Chamber may refuse
audience, the Registrar may withdraw counsel, or the Chamber may impose “[a]ny other
sanctions…”.7
2. Replacing Counsel Is Not Equivalent To Acceding To Delay Tactics So Long
As An Efficient Replacement Mechanism Is Established.

4

Id. at rule 44(B). Rule 44(B) reads: “In the performance of their duties counsel shall be subject to the relevant
provisions of the Statute, the Rules, the Rules of Detention and any other rules or regulations adopted by the
Tribunal, the Host Country Agreement, the Code of Conduct and the codes of practice and ethics governing their
profession and, if applicable, the Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel.” This rule shows that it is
imperative for Tribunals to create and enforce rules by which participants must abide.
5

Id. at rule 45 quarter.

6

Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, at art. 15(E)
& 20(E)(i), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/defence/index.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2006)
[hereinafter Directive] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

7

ICTR Rules, supra note 3, at rule 45 ter (B) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

8

Whether replacing counsel is tantamount to acceding to an attempt to delay the trial
depends on whether replacing counsel will cause an unreasonable delay in the proceeding. In
order to replace counsel without violating the rights of a detainee to Due Process, a Trial
Chamber must efficiently replace counsel.
Without an efficient replacement mechanism, granting a request intended to delay the
proceeding will be equivalent to acceding to the tactics of the defense. With an efficient
replacement mechanism, granting a request will not unreasonably delay the proceedings.
Whether or not the request was intended to delay is then irrelevant because the tactic cannot
produce the desired effect.
3. Tribunals Are Reluctant To Rely On Co-Counsel To Replace Lead Counsel
Because Of Due Process Considerations And The Possibility That CoCounsel May Continue The Delay Tactics.
Tribunals are reluctant to have co-counsel serve as lead counsel because it can easily
infringe on the due process rights of the Defendant. International Criminal Tribunals are created
to independently prove the guilt of those charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide. Only through an impartial Tribunal, which fully respects the importance of Due
Process, will such truths be proven to the reasonable doubt standard required for a conviction.
Due Process is comprised of the procedural formalities by which all participants in a
tribunal must abide in order to ensure that those who are charged are tried fairly. Without
enforcement of Due Process rights, States may arbitrarily arrest, charge and convict anyone, of
any crime. If an International Tribunal is unable to uphold the necessary standards established to

9

sustain convictions, then the Tribunal is illegitimate. For an International Tribunal, both respect
for and adherence to Due Process are of the utmost importance.8
4. Duty Counsel Should Be Appointed To Protect The Rights Of The Defendant
And To Enhance The Fairness Of The Tribunal.
The right to counsel begins with the First Geneva Convention9 (“Geneva I”), is reiterated
in the Third Geneva Convention10 (Geneva III), and extends to any prisoner of war. Of all the
rights retained by prisoners of war, the right to counsel is of paramount importance. It is with
power exercised through counsel that a defendant is able to benefit from their full Due Process
rights.
Under Rule 44 bis (D), duty counsel must be appointed “as soon as practicable”
whenever a person who qualifies for duty counsel is unrepresented by counsel.11 Under Rule 45
bis, Rules 44 and 45 apply to any person detained under the authority of the Tribunal.12 The
combination of Rule 44 bis and Rule 45 bis force the Registrar to summon duty counsel any time
a person detained under the authority of the Tribunal is unrepresented.
However, duty counsel is only a temporary solution to a continuing problem. Without
effective representation, a detainee can neither be adequately informed of his rights nor exercise
8

See Michael P. Scharf & Christopher M. Rassi, Do Former Leaders Have an International Right to SelfRepresentation in War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (2005), at 7 [hereinafter
Scharf] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
9

See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950),
available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/fe20c3d903ce27e3c125641e004a92f3 (last
visited Apr. 28, 2006) [hereinafter GCI] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
10

See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68 (last
visited Apr. 28, 2006) [hereinafter GCIII] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

11

ICTR Rules, supra note 3, rule 44 bis (D) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

12

Id. at rule 45 bis.

10

them in any meaningful way. Representation by counsel ensures that a detainee has at least one
person working for their best interests, defending them zealously until the end of the
proceedings, and ensuring that every possible legitimate avenue of defense is explored entirely.
Duty counsel must be appointed for any detainee who is not represented by counsel.
5. A Public-Defender System Will Benefit The International Tribunals And
Serve As An Efficient Solution To Problems Raised By Misconduct Of
Counsel, But Only If It Is Carefully Organized And Well Funded.
A public defender system will only solve such problems if: public defenders are well
trained and experienced; the public defenders are well funded; and the public defenders are able
to coordinate their defenses. Appointing an attorney as defense counsel who is not adequately
trained and versed in the appropriate international law must impede the proceedings.13
At present, the Office of the Registrar is charged with the duty of assigning counsel to
indigent detainees before the Tribunal for Rwanda. This is in direct conflict with the duty of the
Registrar to control costs. An independent and financially autonomous Office of Defense will
serve to better protect the Due Process rights of detainees. An Office of Defense, fully funded
and independent from the Registrar, must be created to overcome this systematic violation of
Due Process.
6. International Tribunals Must Recommend Sanctions To Neither Bar
Associations Nor Universities; However, Bars and Universities Have
Discretion To Investigate Matters Referred To Them.

13

The realm of international war crimes prosecution is a relatively new, unexplored and uncharted area of
customary international law. The difficulties encountered by defense counsel are compounded by the fact that
lawyers must refer to cases and statutes from around the world, some nearly 60 years old. Judges are reluctant to
attempt to piece together these conflicting and disparate clues, explicitly refusing to rule on procedural or
substantive questions until the final judgment is presented, further compounding the difficulties faced by defense
counsel. Some counselors are wholly unfamiliar with the procedure used in hybrid courts like the Tribunal for
Rwanda. The Tribunal for Rwanda utilizes a fundamentally adversarial approach during witness cross-examination,
a tactic with which civil law professionals may find themselves unfamiliar, whether professors or counselors.

11

On 8 November 1994, the International Tribunal for Rwanda was created by the U.N.
Security Council (“UNSC”). Exercising authority derived from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
(“Charter”), the UNSC passed Resolution 955 providing for the Statute of the Tribunal.14
Obligations under Chapter VII of the Charter only apply to States. As a general rule, Bar
Associations and Universities are not State organs. Because independent non-State
administrative agencies are not under the direct control of a State they are therefore not required
to enforce punishments recommended by international Tribunals.
The decision in Blaskic defines some of the limits of the jurisdiction and authority of
International Tribunals vis-à-vis States and State organs. Tribunals are created by the U.N.
Security Council and are in a special position of power. However, the sanctioning authority of
Tribunals is limited to reporting misconduct to the Security Council; Tribunals are required to
neither recommend nor merely suggest sanctions. The determination and enforcement of
sanctions is strictly under the dominion of the Security Council.
7. With Recourse To Neither Bar Associations Nor Universities, International
Tribunals Must Punish Misconduct By Counsel According To Their Own
Rules and Procedures.
A Trial Chamber must punish counsel of its own accord with jurisdiction and authority
inherent to every court. With recourse to neither Bar Associations nor Universities, an
International Tribunal must utilize methods of discipline available internally. Without the power
to internally enforce the rules of procedure, a court is not a legitimate fact-finding body. Due
Process concerns require all parties involved to respect and abide by the rules. Without
enforcement of internal regulations a court cannot possibly hope to be recognized as a legitimate
International Tribunal.
14

U.N. CHARTER, art. 7, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2006) [hereinafter
Charter] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

12

Under Rule 46(B), after a warning, a Trial Chamber may, and only with approval of the
President, report misconduct of counsel to their regulating body, be it Bar or University.15 Under
Rule 46(A), after a warning, a Chamber may impose sanctions against counsel if their conduct
“remains offensive or abusive, obstructs the proceedings, or is otherwise contrary to the interests
of justice.”16 Rule 45 ter (B) allows a Chamber to impose “any other sanctions…”17 but is
limited by Rule 77.18
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Since the beginning of his trial, Slobodan Milosevic received treatment far more
lenient than that provided to the average defendant. Partly because of concerns for
the health of Mr. Milosevic, the ICTY held proceedings three time per week (instead
of five) and for only four hours per day (instead of eight). In addition, the
prosecution was ordered to reduce the number of witnesses to hasten the trial. On
Saturday the 11th of March, 2006, after three years of trials and within three months
of the scheduled completion date, Mr. Milosevic was found dead in his cell in The
Hague. The ICTY will never have its crowning conviction.

B.

Saddam Hussein is currently being tried before the IST. Since his trial began, Mr.
Hussein has been belligerent to nearly everyone in the court; he has insulted judges,
intimidated witnesses, and behaved with the conduct typical of a child. If Mr.
Hussein is allowed to continue, it can only lead to disastrous consequences. If

15

ICTR Rules, supra note 3, rule 46(B) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

16

Id. at rule 46(A).

17

Id. at rule 45 ter (B).

18

Id. at rule 77.

13

appropriate action is not taken to restrain him, Mr. Hussein will continue to disrupt
proceedings, creating a cloud of doubt hanging over the legitimacy of the IST.
C. Mr. Seselj, a defendant before the ICTY, was appointed stand-by counsel over his
objection. The court reasoned that Mr. Seselj presented a looming threat to the
proceedings. It was clear to the Tribunal that Mr. Seselj intended to use the
proceedings to further his own political agenda. As such, the Tribunal assigned
stand-by counsel to assist Mr. Seselj with the preparation of his defense and offering
advice. In addition, stand-by counselors were intended to step-in and efficiently
replace him should such action be necessary to safeguard a fair and expeditious
trial.19
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Under The Rule Of Procedure And Evidence Of The ICTR, Counsel Failing To
Appear May Be Withdrawn, Refused An Audience Before The Tribunal, Or
Suffer “Any Other Sanctions” That The Tribunal Deems Appropriate.
All courts have inherent jurisdiction to hold contempt proceedings for anyone appearing
before them.20 The power to create and enforce rules of procedure and evidence strengthens the
appearance of, and argument for, the legitimacy of a court.21 The power to enforce internal
regulations shows the world that a court is not merely a soap-box from which baseless
accusations will be hurled. By requiring compliance with strict rules of procedure and evidence,
a court ensures that Due Process is observed and respected both by prosecution and defense.
Without power to enforce rules of procedure and evidence, a court is merely a circus.
19

Seselj, supra note 1, at para. 28 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].

20

Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the
Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, para. 33, (ICTY Appeals Chamber, Oct. 29, 1997) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

21

Scharf, supra note 8, at 7 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].

14

As a condition precedent to appearing before the Tribunal, under Rule 44 (B) counsel are
subject to, among other regulations, any rules adopted by the Tribunal, the Code of Conduct and
the code of ethics governing their profession.22
Under Rule 45 quarter, as insurance against a counsel failing to appear, a Trial Chamber
may assign one or more co-counsel.23 The initial counsel retains primary responsibility for the
conduct of the defense; but should initial counsel be unavailable or be replaced, the appointed
co-counsel automatically assumes responsibility for the case.24 Under Rule 45 ter (B), when
counsel fails to appear, a Trial Chamber may refuse audience, the Registrar may withdraw that
counsel, or the Chamber may impose “[a]ny other sanctions…”.25
A Trial Chamber, with the approval of the President, may report misconduct of counsel to
their domestic sanctioning body.26 Under the decision of the ICTY in Blaskic27, a Trial Chamber
is only allowed to report misconduct.28 The Chamber went on to say that, in order to fully
respect customary international law and sovereignty of States, a Tribunal has neither authority
nor jurisdiction to request a particular type of sanction.29 Specific penalties are to be doled out
by the Security Council.30 In rare cases, where the misconduct of counsel is of such a level that

22

ICTR Rules, supra note 3, rule 44(B) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

23

Id. at rule 45 quarter.

24

Directive, supra note 6, at art. 15(E) & 20(E)(i) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

25

ICTR Rules, supra note 3, rule 45 ter (B) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

26

Id. at rule 46 (B).

27

Blaskic, supra note 20 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

28

Id. at para. 33.

29

Id. at para. 36.

30

Id. para. 35-37.

15

it qualifies as a continuing threat to peace and security, it is possible for a coalition of States to
take action.31
The combination of these rules outlines the basic remedies available to a Chamber.
There are five basic remedies that a Chamber may exercise. A Chamber may refuse audience.32
The Registrar may withdraw counsel.33 A Chamber may impose “[a]ny other sanctions…”34
deemed appropriate.35 A Chamber may report the misconduct of counsel to their domestic
regulating body.36 Perhaps most importantly, more than one counselor may be assigned to a
detainee.37
International Tribunals have exercised these remedies in response to misconduct of
defense counselors. In Musema38 before the ICTR, the Trial Chamber withdrew and replaced the
appointed defense counsel after repeated attempts to gain her attendance. Contempt proceedings
were not held; but the matter was referred to the Geneva Bar.39 The ICTY exercised authority
granted by the phrase “[a]ny other sanction…” to impose fines on counsel who violate rules of
31

Id. para. 36.

32

ICTR Rules, supra note 3, rule 45 ter (B) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id. at rule 77. Rule 77 provides some guidance for Chambers in the application of their authority to sanction
under the phrase “interests of justice’. Rule 77 limits the penalties and sanctions that a Chamber may implement
should a counselor be held in contempt of court. Rule 77 limits the fine that may be imposed to Ten-thousand U.S.
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the Chamber. In Aleksovski40, a Trial Chamber fined defense counsel for his alleged “knowing
revelation” of the identity of an anonymous witness. An Appeal Chamber ordered the Registrar
to repay the fine upon presentation of evidence that counsel did not have actual knowledge of the
protected identity.41
Detainees must be represented by multiple counselors throughout the proceedings against
them. This initial redundancy ensures that, regardless of the behavior of individual counsel, it
will be possible to immediately replace them with an equally prepared and appropriate counsel.
Swift replacement will allow the smooth progression of proceedings while ensuring the Tribunal
does not infringe upon the due process rights of the detainee.
While an indigent detainee has a right to an assigned counsel, a Trial Chamber is still
allowed to assign further counselors in the interests of justice.42 Assignment of additional
counselors can only serve to enhance the protection of the due process rights of detainees.
Assignment of multiple counselors substantially increases the likelihood that detainees will
always have counsel available to represent them until the end of the proceedings against them.
Multiple counselors also protect the innocent accused facing an otherwise unnecessarily
protracted trial and the victims suffering an unimaginable agony while awaiting the outcome of it
all.
B. Replacing Counsel Is Not Equivalent To Acceding To Delay Tactics So Long As
An Efficient Replacement Mechanism Is Established
Whether replacing counsel is equivalent to acceding to an attempt to delay the trial
depends on whether replacing counsel will cause unreasonable delay in the proceeding. In order
40

Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Judgement on Appeal by Anto Nobilo Against Finding of
Contempt, (ICTR Appeals Chamber, May 30, 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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Directive, supra note 6, at art. 15(C) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
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to replace counsel without endangering the due process rights of a detainee, a Trial Chamber
must efficiently replace counsel.
Without an efficient replacement mechanism, granting a request intended to delay the
proceeding will be equivalent to acceding to such delay. With an efficient replacement
mechanism, granting a request will not unreasonably delay the proceedings, whether or not the
request was intended to do so.
Defense counsel may be replaced by the Registrar upon a good faith request by the
detainee.43 Defense counsel may also be replaced on the initiative of the Registrar.44 Whether
there was an ulterior tactic of delay beneath a legitimate request for replacement should be
irrelevant. In such limited situations the legitimate purpose of enforcing the due process rights of
the defendant outweighs the fact that technically the tactic of delay was allowed to succeed.
The perceived legitimacy of the Tribunal is of the utmost importance45 to ensure valid
convictions of only those who are guilty of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The
ICTR will be a legitimate Tribunal, whose convictions will be respected by future historians,
only if it respects and enforces the Due Process rights of detainees.
British Prime Minister William E. Gladstone once said, “Justice delayed is justice
denied.” In addition to serving 4 terms as the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in 1896 he openly
condemned the massacre of the Armenians by the Ottoman Empire.46 Widely regarded to be the
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44

Id.

45
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Wikipedia, William Ewart Gladstone, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Gladstone (last visited April 28,
2006) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
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greatest British Prime Minister, even Winston Churchill cites the Right Honorable Gladstone as
his inspiration.47
Justice delayed is indeed justice denied for all parties involved: for the innocent accused;
for the rightfully convicted; and for the survivors. The negative effects of delays in applications
of justice are most obvious for the innocent accused and for the survivors; but the impact of
delays should not be discounted when applied to those who are eventually rightfully convicted.
For the wrongfully accused, a delay of justice amounts to nothing less than extended
periods of their life being forcibly taken from them. It is widely known that international critics
of the American capital punishment system frequently remark that one of the critical flaws is the
prolonged period that a convict must remain in custody during the extensive mandatory appeal
process. This protracted period of incarceration and delay is widely considered to be a form of
cruel and unusual punishment. This outcry stems from a person who has been properly
convicted and sentenced to death, whose life is effectively over. The negative ramifications of
unnecessary delays for a person who will not necessarily be convicted, but must still suffer
through such extensive procedures, must necessarily be greater than those who are already
legitimately convicted.
For the survivors of these heinous atrocities, the delay of justice is an unnecessary
extension of the anguish they are suffering. International tribunals are created to deal with the
aftermath of the most disturbing crimes; war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
One of the functions served by International Tribunals is to alleviate the suffering of the
survivors by demonstrating that the prime movers of the atrocities will not be allowed to escape

47

Id.
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punishment. Every moment the prime movers are allowed to walk free is another moment the
survivors’ suffering is extended.
Even those who are properly detained and indicted under the authority of an International
Tribunal have a right to a speedy trial. In Barayagwisa, a detainee of the ICTR was held for two
years before his trial. Because of this long delay, the Appeals chamber dismissed the charges
against Mr. Barayagwisa with prejudice to the prosecutor and ordered an immediate release of
Mr. Barayagwisa. The case against Mr. Barayagwisa was renewed after the prosecution
presented newly discovered evidence.48 The President of the ICTY has proposed a system
whereby any defendant who is unjustly detained or prosecuted would be compensated.49
Allowing defense counsel to implement a tactic of delay is utterly unacceptable. Tribunals must
exercise any measures available, while respecting Due Process, to ensure that unnecessary delays
do not occur.
C. Tribunals Are Reluctant To Rely On Co-Counsel To Replace Lead Counsel
Because Of Due Process Considerations And The Possibility That Co-Counsel
May Continue The Delay Tactics.
Tribunals are reluctant to have co-counsel serve as lead counsel because it can easily
infringe on the due process rights of the Defendant. Clearly, one of the primary interests of a
State is to prosecute criminals, those who violate the laws of the State. Established as well,
criminal courts exist to independently prove the truth of allegations to the reasonable doubt
standard to support such prosecutions.
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Richard J. Wilson, Assigned Defense Counsel in Domestic and International War Crimes Tribunals: The Need for
a Structural Approach, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 145 (2002), at 189 [hereinafter Wilson] [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 27].
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Speech by His Excellency, Mr. Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, to the UN Security Council, June 20, 2000, at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p512-e.htm (last visited
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International Criminal Tribunals are created to independently prove the guilt of those
who commit acts spanning international borders or too devastating for domestic courts to deal
with adequately. By determining who is responsible for the planning and execution of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, International Tribunals serve the important
function of fostering reconciliation50, instead of allowing prejudices and misconceptions to
fester. In addition to pinning responsibility on those most responsible51, International Tribunals
serve several other important functions.
Principally, Tribunals will create an historic record of the atrocities.52 This record will
educate future generations not only about the atrocities committed, but also about the
consequences for those who commit such heinous acts. Furthermore, the Tribunals will provide
an ever-improving model as an example of how to properly conduct proceedings against
perpetrators of such grievous crimes.53 In addition, the Tribunals serve to show the world that in
the aftermath of unimaginable destruction and grief, the rule of law will remain supreme, based
on principles of justice, reason, fairness and due process.54
Only through an impartial Tribunal, which fully respects the importance of Due Process,
will such truths be proven to the reasonable doubt standard required for a conviction.55 Perhaps
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The reasonable doubt standard is quickly becoming solidified in customary international law as the standard of
proof to be used in criminal trials. Both the ICTY in article 87 of the ICTY Statute, and the ICTR at 87 of the ICTR
Statute require proof to the reasonable doubt standard.
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more importantly, without the perception that International Tribunals are legitimate and fair,
none of these goals can be achieved.56
Due Process is comprised of the restrictions by which all participants in a tribunal must
abide in order to ensure that those who are charged are tried fairly. Without enforcement of Due
Process rights, States may arbitrarily arrest, charge and convict anyone, of any crime.
Two-Hundred years ago, customary international law recognized no such Due Process
rights. Since then, as described below, Due Process rights have grown to include, but are not
limited to: a presumption of innocence;57 an impartial judiciary;58 assistance of counsel;59 crossexamination of witnesses60; a presentation of a complete defense;61 and the right to an appeal.62
The right to counsel before International Tribunals, and before State courts, is a relatively
recent phenomenon. As late as the 1870’s, very few States in Western Europe recognized a right
to counsel. For example, Russia did not recognize such a right until 1917. Prior to the atrocities
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committed by every State involved in World War I, a right to counsel rarely, if ever, appears in
statutes governing prisoners of war.63
Geneva I64 is the first international document to recognize the right of a prisoner of war to
be represented by defense counsel during judicial proceedings.65 Geneva I contained several of
the same provisions of prior international agreements, such as the detaining State retaining
jurisdiction over a prisoner, and the detaining State being able to try prisoners in a military
tribunal modeled on the national tribunals of that State.
After the stirring reminder of how horrifically people treat each other provided by World
War II, States convened again to redraft the Geneva Conventions, ending with the publication of
the Geneva III.66 Articles 82 through 108 of Geneva III expanded and clarified the rights of
prisoners in judicial hearings. Article 105 of Geneva III grants a prisoner of war, who is accused
of a crime and does not exercise his right to select counsel, the right to have counsel assigned
without regard to the financial status of the prisoner.67
In addition to the updated Geneva III, the International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg),
and the International Military Tribunal (Tokyo), establish several minimum standards for
international military trials. For example, in every case before these two Tribunals, every
accused person was represented by counsel. These two Tribunals establish the right to be
63
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International and Domestic Law Analysis, 14 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 175 (2003), at 3 [reproduced in
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represented by counsel before an international tribunal, but do not explicitly define the extent of
that right.
If an International Tribunal is unable to uphold the standards necessary to sustain
convictions, then the Tribunal is illegitimate. Without strict adherence to Due Process, an
International Tribunal is not a Court of Justice, it is merely a Tool of States, used to enforce the
will of States. For an International Tribunal, both respect for and adherence to Due Process are
of the utmost importance.68 Without integrity, the Tribunal will merely force the will of large,
wealthy and powerful countries upon smaller, growing countries, preventing them from
determining their own futures.
To protect the interests of everyone69 in ensuring Due Process is respected, stand-by
counselors have been appointed, even over the objection of detainees. In Norman70, from the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Trial Chamber concluded that Mr. Norman could not
represent himself without stand-by counsel71 and appointed stand-by counsel over the request by
the detainee that he represent himself.72 The Trial Chamber distinguished Norman from
Milosevic on two grounds.
First, the Trial Chamber notes that Norman is being tried as part of a case with multiple
defendants.73 Second, the Trial Chamber points out that that unlike Mr. Milosevic, who always
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maintained his desire to represent himself, Mr. Norman did not make his intention to represent
himself known until well into the proceedings against him74, after more than a year of
representation by counsel.75 Because of the complexity involved in presenting defense in an
International Tribunal, and because of the national and international interest in the swift
completion of the proceedings the Trial Chamber reasoned that appointing stand-by counsel is
appropriate.76
In Seselj, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that Mr. Seselj should be assisted by stand-by
counsel and reserved the right to assign full counsel.77 The Trial Chamber points out that Article
21 of the ICTY Statue is not a prima facie exclusion of “offering an accused the assistance of
assigned counsel where the interests of justice so require. The need may arise for unforeseeable
reasons to protect an accused’s interest and to ensure a fair and expeditions trial.”78 The
assignment of stand-by counsel was not exactly what the Prosecution requested79 when
presenting their rejected motion seeking an order that the Registrar “appoint legal counsel to
assist the accused Seselj with the preparation and conduct of his defence.”80
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The Trial Chamber then went one step further in an attempt to more fully define the
phrase “interests of justice”. The Chamber reasoned that the phrase “interests of justice”
includes the right of the accused to a fair trial which is “also a fundamental interest of the
Tribunal related to its own legitimacy.”81 In addition, the Tribunal has a “legitimate interest in
ensuring that the trial proceeds in a timely manner without interruptions, adjournments or
disruptions.”82
Furthermore, in addition to describing some of the of the rights and goals protected by the
phrase “interests of justice”, the Chamber reasoned that in order to adequately determine the
extent of the application of the phrase, in the context of the right to a fair trial, a Trial Chamber
must consider “the length of the case…”83 as well as, “its size and complexity…”84 because
“complex legal, evidential and procedural issues that arise in a case of this magnitude may fall
outside the competence of even a legally qualified accused…”85 especially when the accused is
in jail.86 There are legitimate reasons to appoint stand-by counsel and full counsel, even over the
objection of the detainee.
D. Duty Counsel Should Be Appointed To Protect The Rights Of The Defendant
And To Enhance The Fairness Of The Tribunal.
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There are multiple detainees of the International Tribunals who, in other circumstances, would be candidates to
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ability to prepare a proper defense, Tribunal risk infringing the Due Process rights of a defendant by allowing them
to proceed unrepresented.
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During the last One-Hundred years, the laws of nations, as reflected in customary
international law, have come to recognize the importance of observing, and preserving, the rights
of individuals involved in international conflicts. These rights are continuously expanding and
have grown to explicitly include a right to counsel for prisoners of war.87
The right of a detainee, in an international conflict, to be represented by counsel is an
outgrowth of individual States recognizing a right to be represented by counsel before domestic
courts.88 Prior to Geneva I, a prisoner of war was afforded the rights usually given to defendants
in the domestic courts of the detaining State. Combatant states, individually respecting this right
in domestic counts, applied the same doctrine to military Tribunals during their conflicts.
By the end of World War I, enough States recognized a right to counsel in their domestic
courts for such a right to be recognized in Geneva I89 to be applied without prejudice to every
defendant before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) and the International Military
Tribunal (Tokyo).
The international right to counsel was suggested in Geneva I90, reiterated in Geneva III91,
and extends to any prisoner of war. Of all the rights retained by prisoners of war, the right to
counsel is of paramount importance. It is only with power exercised through his counsel that the
due process rights defendant can be preserved, safe-guarded and guaranteed.
87
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Under Rule 45 of the rules of procedure for the ICTR, the Office of the Registrar is
charged with the duty to ensure that all persons detained by the authority of the tribunal are
represented by counsel.92 This duty ensures that the due process rights of detainees to counsel
are not infringed.
Under Rule 44 bis (D), duty counsel must be appointed “as soon as practicable”
whenever a person who qualifies for duty counsel is unrepresented.93 Under Rule 45 bis, Rules
44 and 45 apply to any person detained under the authority of the Tribunal.94 The combination
of Rule 44 bis and Rule 45 bis force the Registrar to summon duty counsel any time a person
detained under the authority of the Tribunal is unrepresented.
However, duty counsel is only a temporary solution to a continuing problem. Without
effective and permanent representation, a detainee can neither be adequately informed of his
rights nor exercise them effectively. Representation by counsel ensures that a detainee has at
least one person working for their best interests, defending them zealously until the end of the
proceedings against them, and ensuring that every possible legitimate avenue of defense is
thoroughly explored.
The process for selection of counsel for detainees of the Tribunal for Rwanda has
changed several times during the history of the Tribunal. Amnesty International, for one, has
criticized the manner in which counselors are selected. Amnesty contends that even if detainees
are not allowed to select their counsel from literally any qualified individual, it is a good policy
to allow a detainee the widest possible selections. This broad latitude will help to promote trust
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between the detainee and counsel, fostering an effective representation.95 Every person detained
by the Tribunal has a right to be represented,96 even if only temporarily, by duty counsel.97 Duty
counsel must be appointed for any detainee who is not represented by counsel.98
E. A Public-Defender System Will Benefit The International Tribunals And Serve
As An Efficient Solution To Problems Raised By Misconduct Of Counsel, But
Only If It Is Carefully Organized And Well Funded.
A public defender system will only solve the preceding problems if several conditions are
met. At a minimum, counselors appointed as public defenders must be well trained and
experienced, the public defenders, as a group, must be well funded, and perhaps most
importantly, the public defenders must be able to coordinate their defenses, instead of each
counselor arguing their case independent of all the other cases.
Appointing an attorney as defense counsel who is not adequately trained and versed in
the appropriate international law must inevitably lead to erroneous judgments, unnecessary
delays, and excessive costs. In Erdemovic99, discussed below, a civil-law attorney unfamiliar
with the adversarial system was allowed to represent a defendant before the ICTY, eventually
leading the Appeals chamber to overturn the initial sentence of ten years.100
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[hereinafter Erdemovic App Judgement] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16] This one adverse
decision cost the ICTY in immeasurable ways. First and foremost, it cost the tribunal respect; without valid
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Without the necessary funding, sufficiently training public defenders will be impossible.
If defendants are appointed inadequately trained and improperly equipped defense counsel, this
creates at least one direct and recognized avenue for appeal. Defendants can appeal on the basis
that they remained uninformed even though represented by counsel, because counsel were
themselves uninformed.101
The realm of international war crimes prosecution is a relatively new, unexplored and
uncharted area of customary international law. The crimes dealt with daily by the ICTR war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity were poorly defined when first conceived for use
by the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals and since then have only been rarely enforced before the
creation of the ICTY and the ICTR. The difficulties encountered by defense counsel are
compounded by the fact that lawyers must refer to cases and statutes from around the world,
some nearly 60 years old, written in diverse languages such as English, French, Norwegian,
Danish, Hebrew and Swiss-German.
Even judges are reluctant to attempt to piece together these conflicting and disparate
clues, explicitly refusing to rule on procedural or substantive questions until the final judgment is
presented,102 further compounding the difficulties faced by defense counsel. Defense counsel
must prepare a case where the elements of the crime are not clearly defined and where there may
be a multitude of excusing and mitigating factors, or where there may be none; none of which are
readily ascertainable.
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International Criminal Defense, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1982 (2001), at 6 [hereinafter Harvard] [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
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Erdemovic,103 an early case from the ICTY, demonstrates the necessity of retaining
properly trained attorneys as defense counsel, especially as public defenders. The defendant, Mr.
Erdemovic, was charged with one count of crimes against humanity and, in the alternative, one
count of war crimes.104
On the advice of counsel, Mr. Erdemovic pled guilty to the charge of crimes against
humanity105, the Prosecutor dropped the charge of war crimes106 and the Trial Chamber
sentenced Mr. Erdemovic to 10 years.107 Mr. Erdemovic appealed his sentence.
Upon review of the trial transcript, the Appeals Chamber deduced that neither Mr.
Erdemovic nor his counsel understood the elements of either the charge of war crimes or crimes
against humanity.108 The Appeals Chamber overturned the plea, finding it to be uninformed and
not equivocal.109
In a 4-1 opinion, the Chamber ruled that the charge of crimes against humanity was so
clearly more serious than the charge of war crimes that counsel for Erdemovic did not
understand the law when advising his client to enter a guilty plea to the more serious charge.110
In addition to problems faced by counsel who are uneducated in the realm of international
criminal law, some are wholly unfamiliar with the procedure used in hybrid courts like the ICTR.
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In civil law courts, cross-examination is directed by the judges; but in common law courts, crossexamination is directed by the defense. The ICTR utilizes a fundamentally adversarial approach
during witness cross-examination; a tactic with which civil law professionals may find
themselves unfamiliar, whether professors or counselors.
In the first case before the ICTY, Tadic, it was unfamiliarity with appropriate procedure
that caused the Tribunal unnecessary delays and expenses. Lead counsel for Mr. Tadic, Mr.
Michaïl Wladimiroff, a Dutch criminal defense attorney and professor, recognized he and his cocounsels own deficiency with adversarial trial experience.
To compensate for their unfamiliarity, with cooperation from the ICTY and the American
Bar Association’s Central and East European Law Initiative, a week-long training session was
held by one British and two American attorneys. After this intensive session, Mr. Wladimiroff
remained apprehensive about his abilities and the British attorney was retained as additional cocounsel.111 This one instance of an unprepared attorney cost the ICTY a week of unnecessary
delays and thousands of dollars.
If an Office of Defense were established prior to the commencement of proceedings
against detainees of the ICTY, Messrs. Tadic and Erdemovic would have been represented by
appropriately trained and educated counsel. Consequently, these episodes, and countless more
like them, would never have been a possibility. As a counterpart to the Office of the Prosecutor,
an Office of Defense must be established.
At present, defense counselors are assigned to detainees by the Registrar.112 The
Registrar necessarily has a conflict of interest when assigning defense counsel. The statues
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governing the Registrar of the ICTR state that the Registrar is to assign counsel in the interests of
Justice.113 Under the same statutes, the Registrar is supposed to minimize the costs of providing
defense to indigent detainees.114 An Office of Defense, fully funded and independent from the
Registrar, must be created to overcome this systematic violation of Due Process.
An independent Office of Defense will better protect the due process rights of
detainees.115 At present, the Office of the Registrar is charged with the duty to assign counsel to
indigent detainees before the Tribunal for Rwanda.116 This is in direct conflict with the duty of
the Registrar to control costs.117 The Directives on Assignment of Counsel for the Tribunal for
Rwanda establish that the tribunal shall “meet costs and expenses in legal representation of the
suspect or accused so long as they are necessarily and reasonably incurred.”118 The potential for
a breach of Due Process is evidenced by the fact that defense counsel have been restricted not
only in the number of hours they are allowed to bill, but also in the number of support staff they
are allowed to hire.119
In order to fulfill its duty to the Tribunal, the Registrar must fail its duty detainees. In
order to fulfill its duty to detainees, the Registrar must fail its duty to the Tribunal. Considering
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that the Registrar is an integral part of the administration of the Tribunal120 who, with the Judges,
establishes the criteria for payment121, and defense counselors are independent professionals paid
by the Registrar, it is more likely that the Registrar will fail in its duty to provide a complete
defense.
The primary function of the Registrar is as an administrative agency “to support the
judges, not the lawyers for defense.”122 While having defense counsel assigned by the Registrar
is not a prima facie violation of Due Process it does create a conflict of interests likely to be
resolved against the defense. In 1997 and 1998 the Tribunal for Rwanda placed caps on defense
hiring and hours.123 An Office of Defense must not be subject to arbitrary budgetary restraints;
the prerequisite of presenting full and complete defenses should determine funding, funding
should not determine the completeness of defenses presented.
In Kayishema124, the defendant argued that defense and prosecution should have equal, or
at least less disparate, resources. That particular Trial Chamber reasoned that “the rights of the
accused should not be interpreted to mean that the Defence is entitled to same [sic] means and
resources as the Prosecution.”125 The Chamber further reasoned that “Any other position would
be contrary to the status quo that exists within jurisdictions throughout the world and would
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clearly not reflect the intentions of the drafters of this Tribunal’s Statute.”126 The Trial Chamber
also denied the argument of the defendant that there was a deficiency of resources with regard to
access to evidence and time for the defense to prepare both their case-in-chief and closing
arguments.127 “The Trial Chamber cited no drafting history to support its assertions, nor did it
provide any authority for assertions as to the status quo said to exist in the world’s
jurisdictions.”128 In fact, “its only textual reference was to provisions of the Directive on
Assignment of Defence Counsel requiring that the Tribunal assume only those costs for the
defense that the defendant is himself unable to assume.”129
In a decision from the ICTY, dealing with a prosecution motion to obtain copies of
defense witness statements130, Judge Vohrah reasoned that the concept of equal resources must
favor the accused. Judge Vohrah explained that ordinarily the principle of equal resources exists
to ensure that the defense is able to present a case utilizing means “equal to those available to the
Prosecution which has all the advantages of the State on its side.”131 While the logic of Judge
Vohrah has been criticized by later ICTY rulings, the mention of the importance of equal
resources shows that such an idea cannot be idly dismissed and must instead be given all
appropriate consideration, especially in the realm of International Tribunals.
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Due Process includes a right to present a complete defense.132 In an article written as the
vice-president of the International Criminal Defence Attorney Association, Professor Michaïl
Wladimiroff said: “A full and fair defence is an essential element of any claim to conduct a fair
trial and enforce the rule of law.”133 Presentation of a complete defense is impossible if counsel
for the defense is overwhelmed by the sheer size of the prosecution. Without equality of
resources between the Prosecution and the Defense, presentation of a complete defense is
impossible and the due process rights of every detainee are systematically violated.
Regional and multi-lateral treaty enforcement bodies, international lawyers groups,
Amnesty International, the ICTY and the ICTR all agree that a right to equal resources is a part
of the right to a fair trial.134 The idea of equal resources is rarely applied in practice without
prejudice. Case law from both the ICTY and ICTR reveals a propensity for favoring the
prosecution, especially “with regard to training, access to documents, support staff,
compensation and other resource questions.”135
Under article 15(C) of the ICTR Directive the Registrar may assign multiple counselors
to a detainee, if appropriate and if requested by lead counsel.136 It is always appropriate to assign
multiple counselors to represent individual detainees. The complexity of international war
crimes trials makes multiple counselors necessary.137 Initially the Registrar of the ICTR was
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only to assign individual counsel. After the decision in Akeyasu138, where denial of a request for
multiple counselors was considered a denial of Due Process, the rules of the ICTR were amended
to allow additional counsel to be assigned. In addition to a request from initial counsel,
assignment of additional counselors still requires approval by the Registrar.139 To appropriately
protect Due Process, multiple counselors must be assigned to every detainee who does not refuse
appointed counsel. In some instances, it is equally appropriate to assign stand-by or full counsel
over the objections of the detainee.
F. International Tribunals Must Recommend Sanctions To Neither Bar
Associations Nor Universities; However, Bars and Universities Have Discretion
To Investigate Matters Referred To Them.
On 8 November 1994, the ICTR was created by the UNSC.140 Exercising authority
derived from Chapter VII of the Charter, the UNSC passed Resolution 955 providing for the
Statute of the Tribunal.141 Member States of the U.N., which is to say signatory States to the
Charter, are bound thereby to abide by the decisions of the UNSC.142 Only States may be
members of the U.N., consequently, non-state entities are excluded.
Obligations under Chapter VII of the Charter only apply to States.143 As a general rule,
Bar Associations and Universities are not organs of a State. Instead, Bar Associations are
independent agencies outside the direct authority and control of a State. Because independent
non-State administrative agencies are not organs of a State they are therefore not required to
138
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carry-out punishments recommended by international Tribunals. Bar Associations and
Universities are allowed, and may be politically expected, to inquire on their own initiative but
they are certainly not obligated.
According to the Statute of the ICTR, States are explicitly required to comply with
certain requests of the Tribunal.144 States are required to comply with “any request for assistance
or an order issued by a Trial Chamber.”145 Article 28 specifically enumerates that States “must
assist”146 with: the identification or location of persons; the arrest or detention of persons; the
surrender or transfer of persons to the Tribunal; the service of documents; the taking of
testimony; and with the production of evidence.147 Article 28 also says that this list is not
exhaustive.148
The ICTY considered the extent of Tribunal authority and jurisdiction vis-à-vis States and
State organs in the case of Blaskic.149 The Appeals Chamber began to define the limits and
scope of the authority and jurisdiction vested in International Tribunals by the UNSC. The
Appeals Chamber reasoned that Article 29 of the Statute of the ICTY imposes upon all Member
States an obligation to “lend cooperation and judicial assistance to the…Tribunal.”150
The Chamber further noted that the UNSC, “the body entrusted with primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has solemnly enjoined all
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member States to comply with orders and requests of the International Tribunal.”151 This
particular wording demonstrates that any power a Tribunal may have stems from the UNSC; the
ICTY itself does not have the power to force compliance. Sanctions are under the exclusive
control of the UNSC. The Chamber concludes their reasoning by remarking that “[e]very
Member State of the United Nations has a legal interest in the fulfillments of the obligation”152 of
cooperation with the Tribunal.
After elaborating about the source and scope of the authority and jurisdiction of the
ICTY, the Appeals Chamber discussed the appropriate remedies in the case of non-compliance.
The Chamber reiterated and clarified their earlier language, reasoning that “the International
Tribunal is not vested with any enforcement or sanctionary power vis-à-vis States. It is primarily
for its parent body, the Security Council, to impose sanctions…”153 under the authority of
Chapter VII of the Charter. This language makes the lack of sanctioning power vested in
International Tribunals when dealing with States directly abundantly clear.
The appropriate course of action for a Tribunal to undertake when dealing with a
disobedient State is to make a judicial finding of non-compliance and to report their finding to
the UNSC.154 This judicial finding is made by the Tribunal, exercising their inherent power to
“make all those judicial determinations that are necessary for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction.”155 The court explained that this inherent power must exist for a Tribunal so that
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“its basic judicial function may be fully discharged and its judicial role safeguarded.”156 The
power to report is an extension of the relationship between the Tribunal and the UNSC.
The UNSC creates International Tribunals to prosecute those responsible for violations of
international law; it logically follows that if a State fails in its duty to cooperate with the
Tribunal, preventing the Tribunal from achieving its mission, the Tribunal is then “entitled to
report this non-observance to the Security Council.”157 The UNSC does not take such findings
lightly. On at least 5 separate occasions after a reports were made, the President of the UNSC
made a statement on behalf of the whole body addressed to the insubordinate State.158
To clarify the extent and content of such reports the Chamber held that a Tribunal “must
not include any recommendations or suggestions…”159 as to what sanctions, if any, should be
applied. The Chamber went on to say that Tribunals “may not encroach upon the sanctionary
powers accruing to the Security Council…”160 under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The
Chamber further held that the President of the Tribunal, when exercising their duty to transmit
the report to the UNSC only has the role of nuncius; they must simply transmit the judicial
finding to the UNSC with neither recommendations nor suggestions for sanctions.161
States who do not comply with legal requests of International Tribunals are subject to
several sanctions. Aside from any remedial actions taken by the UNSC, collective or unilateral
action may be taken by Member States. Unilateral action is restricted to a request that the
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delinquent State terminate its breach;162 examples of acceptable collective action include:
political or moral condemnation, a collective request to comply; and economic or diplomatic
sanctions.163 Tribunal actions brought against States for non-compliance with legal Tribunal
requests are limited in that Tribunals must neither recommend nor suggest sanctions, a fortiori,
when dealing with non-State administrative entities Tribunals must exercise equivalent restraint.
Under Rule 8.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the
American Bar Association (ABA), counselors admitted to practice in any U.S. jurisdiction are
always subject to the authority of that jurisdiction, no matter where they conduct their practice.164
Rule 8.5 explicitly states that counsel may be subject to the authority of more than one
jurisdiction for the same conduct.165 Under the Model Rules, counsel who practice before
international tribunals are still under the authority of their home jurisdiction.166 This system of
dual authority created by the ABA allows an international tribunal to punish American counsel
with whatever inherent authority and remedies the Tribunal has available. However, the ABA is
not obligated to punish counsel for any actions, whether domestic or international.167
This discussion illustrates how one country has decided to deal with an hypothetical
situation like that before the Tribunal.168 It is probable that other countries in the world retain
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more direct control over discipline in their Bar Associations and Universities than does the
United States. The only time these two institutions are obligated to enforce punishments handed
down by a Tribunal is if they are organs of the State.169 If a State directly controls and
administers discipline for counselors or professors, and that State is a Member of the U.N., then
the State is directly obligated to honor the punishments doled out by the UNSC.
G. With Recourse To Neither Bar Associations Nor Universities, International
Tribunals Must Punish Misconduct By Counsel According To Their Own Rules
and Procedures.
A Tribunal must punish counsel of its own accord with the jurisdiction and authority
inherent to every court.170 Tribunal Chambers have the authority and jurisdiction to hold
contempt proceedings171 for counsel (both prosecution and defense) and for detainees appearing
before them. Without the power to internally enforce rules of procedure and evidence, a court is
not a legitimate fact-finding body; instead it is a mere theater for exhibitions, produced and paid
for by States.
Under Rule 46(B), after a warning, and only with the approval of the president, a Trial
Chamber may report misconduct of counsel to their regulating body, be it Bar or University.172
Under Rule 46(A), after a warning, a Chamber may impose sanctions against counsel if their
conduct “remains offensive or abusive, obstructs the proceedings, or is otherwise contrary to the

is outside the scope of this memo. However the topic should not be dismissed based on the research presented in
this memo. Further inquiry must be performed if the problem is to be resolved in a manner which respects and
abides by international law, Due Process, and the rights and obligations of States, Counsel and International
Tribunals.
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interests of justice.”173 Rule 45 ter (B) allows a Chamber to impose any sanctions deemed
appropriate,174 but is limited by Rule 77.175
Due Process requires all parties involved to respect and abide by the rules. Prosecutors
and defense must present evidence according to the rules of procedure and evidence to ensure
inadmissible evidence is not presented to the Tribunal. Counsel for all parties must follow
regulations regarding the questioning and cross-examination of witnesses to ensure that the
witness is testifying to what they know and not what they were told to say. Perhaps most
importantly, everyone before a Chamber must abide by the rules of the Chamber regarding
appropriate procedure to address the court, such as: timely filing of motions; appropriate
discourse among Counsel and between Counsel and Judges; as well as making prompt
appearances before a Chamber. Without enforcement of internal regulations a court cannot
possibly hope to be recognized as a legitimate International Tribunal.176
IV. CONCLUSION
International Tribunals represent one of several possible methods of dealing with
perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In addition to directly
punishing those most responsible, International Tribunals accomplish many other important
objectives. International Tribunals create an historic record of the events, the aftermath and the
resolution; they foster reconciliation; they provide a model as an example for future proceedings;
and perhaps most importantly, International Tribunals show the world that the prime movers of
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such heinous atrocities will not escape the rule of Law and go unpunished.177 The use of
International Tribunals has increased dramatically during the last fifteen years, changing the
status quo from one where perpetrators are allowed to go unpunished to one where they are held
accountable for their actions. Unfortunately, as prosecutions become more solidified and
uniform, defenses remain impromptu and individualized.
Without provisions for systematic defenses on an equal footing with systematic
prosecutions, International Tribunals will never be perceived as legitimate fact-finding bodies.
In addition to providing equal resources to prosecution and defense, Tribunals must ensure that
those who appear before them, both counselors and detainees, abide by the regulations of the
Tribunal.
Use of duty counsel ensures that detainees will be represented from the earliest possible
time during the proceedings against them. However, duty counsel is only a measure for
temporary provision of counsel to a detainee. Public defenders, organized under an Office of
Defense, are a legitimate and effective long-term solution. The creation of an Office of Defense
will provide an effective and efficient method to protect the Due Process rights of detainees
while hastening the progress of the court; but only if the Office is carefully constructed and well
funded.
As a punitive measure, Trial Chambers are able to report misconduct of counsel to their
domestic regulating body. While politically this may be an appropriate method of sanction, it is
entirely ineffective. Domestic disciplinary agencies (at least in the United States) rarely, if ever,

177

Id.

44

inquire into referrals from International Tribunals.178 Furthermore International Tribunals may
only report on misconduct and are required to not recommend sanctions.
Instead, Tribunals are allowed to refuse audience to counsel, or the Registrar may replace
counsel entirely. Neither of these penalties ensures that future counsel will not simply repeat the
same disruptive tactics. Replacing insolent counsel with equally disrespectful counsel does not
solve the problem. Instead, Tribunals must punish counsel locally with internal methods already
available. Courts have inherent jurisdiction to hold contempt proceedings for those appearing
before them. Actions speak louder than words; International Tribunals must exercise their
inherent power and authority to enforce the rules of procedure and evidence, protect Due Process
and ensure smooth, efficient and legitimate proceedings.
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